'Similarly, for Frege and Russell (or Russell at least until he became influenced by the doctrines of Wittgenstein), logic is about something, namely, everything.'

'… it begins to look as though these investigations are essentially unbookable…'

'We're always trying to do our second reading first.'

Neighborhood child, Fourth of July, yelling: 'That's illegal!! That's illegal!!'.

('Do the terms really matter, then, as long as I'm feeling it? As long as I put myself into it somehow?' —As if any word could serve at any time to express whatever calls for expression!)

(Or: can you really think through something essentially expressive without drawing on your capacity for expressiveness? Could you possibly suppress it, or treat it as separable, partitionable, as if one could allow oneself expressiveness when out in the world and require of oneself inexpressiveness when trying to be serious in the study?)

(The effort to find satisfactory terms, to find the right words, is part of philosophy.)

(Note ca. p. 12: if we're essentially expressive in our words, our behavior, our responses, our lives, is there a special difficulty with giving expression to the inexpressive, i.e. with instantiating for reflection occasions on which we fall short of our full capacity for expressiveness, i.e., with giving and using examples of ourselves at our most inexpressive? —The imaginative, the figurative, as stable embodiments of the expressiveness only variably manifested, sustained, throughout our day-to-day lives, throughout what we do (for example, in philosophizing).)

'It is typical of my procedures in The World Viewed to invite words or concepts which are common, all but unavoidable, in speaking about film, and then try to discover what there is in these words and in my my experience of these objects that they should go together. This means I must often say things that will sound more or less familiar.'